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Abstract: Households and businesses in the United States prefer to use check payment over less costly,
electronic means of payment. Earlier studies have focused on check “float,” that is, the time lag between
receipt and clearing, as a potential explanation for the continued popularity of checks. An underlying
assumption of these studies is that check float operates as a pure transfer from payee to payor. We
construct a simple general equilibrium model in which payments are made by check. In general
equilibrium, check float does not act as a pure transfer. If float can be priced into market transactions, then
it has no effect on equilibrium allocations. If float is not priced into market transactions, then it acts as a
distorting tax. Our results are consistent with the view that float is a significant factor behind the continued
popularity of check payment. Our results are also consistent with recent data that indicate that the average
value of float (per check) is small.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Payment by check is by far the most popular form of noncash payment in the U.S.
In 1995, 63 billion payments or roughly 80 percent of noncash payments were made by
check. The value of all checks written in 1995 was $73.5 trillion, comprising about 87
percent of “small-value” non-cash payments.
1
While popularity of check payment is beyond dispute, its efficiency is not. Wells
(1996, 5) estimates that the average cost of a payment by check averages roughly $1.60
more than the cost of a payment made electronically via the Fed’s automated
clearinghouse (ACH) system ($2.90 per payment by check vs. $1.30 per payment by ACH
in 1993 dollars). Yet despite this cost disparity and despite increased opportunities to use
ACH and other electronic forms of payment, checks have remained the predominant form
of noncash payment in the U.S. And by some measures, the popularity of check payment
has actually increased in recent years.
2
Does this continued use of an apparently inefficient means of payment constitute a
market failure? According to an influential study by Humphrey and Berger (1990), the
answer to this question is “yes.” Humphrey and Berger identify check float as a potential
cause of market failure. Float is defined as the time lag between the receipt of a check as
payment and its clearing. Until the check clears, the writer of the check has access to the
funds and can earn interest on these funds. Ceteris paribus, the presence of float leads to a
transfer of interest income from the receiver of the check to the check writer. A
sufficiently large transfer could lead to a preference for using checks over electronic
                                                       
1 Figures are from Bank for International Settlements (1996). “Small-value” payments exclude “large-
value” payments made over the Fedwire and CHIPS networks.
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methods of payment which are not subject to float. Using 1987 data, Humphrey and
Berger estimate that the average amount of the float transfer more than compensates for
the cost advantage of ACH over checks.
Humphrey and Berger’s characterization of check float is challenged by Wells
(1996). Using 1993 data, Wells estimates that the average value of check float has fallen
quite dramatically in recent years, i.e., from $1.04 per check in 1987 to $.09 per check in
1993. The decrease in the average float value has resulted from both reductions in check
processing lags and in nominal short-term interest rates. Since the average value of float is
small relative to the differential in average cost between payment by check and payment by
ACH, Wells argues that check float cannot be a source of “market failure” in the market
for payments.
A potential limitation of the analysis in this area has been the partial-equilibrium
nature of its theoretical underpinnings. For example, both Humphrey and Berger (1990,
51) and Wells (1996, 4) characterize float as a pure transfer of income from the check
receiver to check writer.
3 As noted above, this is true in a partial equilibrium sense. In
general equilibrium, however, it stands to reason that beneficiaries of float will use their
additional income to income to bid up prices of the goods they wish to purchase,
potentially leading to distortions in the absence of complete markets.
Below, we present a model that allows for examination of the costs of float in a
general equilibrium environment. The model is an adaptation of Freeman’s (1996) model
of banknote issue. While highly abstract, the model incorporates some relevant features of
the U.S. banking and payments systems. Our findings are as follows.A General Equilibrium Analysis of Check Float 3
First, if the presence of float is sufficiently widespread (though not universal)
throughout the economy, then presence of float may have no effect on equilibrium
allocations. That is, in some cases the income effect of the float transfer may be precisely
offset by substitution effects.
Second, we show that the first result can also hold for the case where banking
markets are characterized by imperfect competition.
Third, a combination of par check valuation and differential clearing lags can cause
float to have allocational consequences. In this case, float inflates the relative prices of
goods which are purchased with checks drawn on remote locations. The effect is a
distortion of relative prices rather than a transfer.
These results are consistent with Humphrey and Berger’s (1990) view that float is
a significant factor behind the continued use of checks. However, our results are also
consistent with Wells’ (1996) findings that the average value of float is small. Our results
imply that so long as the marginal value of float is high for some check writers, it would
be advantageous for many people to use checks, even though the value of float might
appear inconsequential when averaged across all checks.
2.  THE MODEL
2.1  Institutional Environment
A formal model of check float requires certain key ingredients. First, the model
must contain an environment in which economic agents have an incentive to trade, i.e., an
“Edgeworth box.” Second, there should be a role for “checks,” i.e., transfers of inside
                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Humphrey and Berger also note that if additional costs must be incurred in order to generate or reduce
float, then float can result in welfare losses. These effects are discussed in Section 5 below.A General Equilibrium Analysis of Check Float 4
money or privately issued debt, as a medium of exchange. Third, in order to model agents’
incentive to capture the benefits of float, the model should provide a role for both non-
interest bearing government debt or outside money, and for interest-bearing assets such as
government bonds.
To produce a model with these features we will adapt Freeman’s (1996) model, in
which payments are made using privately issued debt. There are a number of distinctions
between our setup and Freeman’s, however. These distinctions result from our placing
certain institutional constraints on the model environment. The constraints are intended to
mimic some noteworthy features of U.S. banking and payments institutions, particularly as
they apply to the use of checks as a payments medium.
First, as in Freeman’s model, agents in our model will make payments using inside
money. However, in our model, only banks may create inside money, and inside money
cannot be issued in circulating (banknote) form. Instead, inside money can only be created
as demand deposits at banks. When a demand deposit claim is transferred in order to make
a purchase, then the transfer must be cleared through the banking system in order for the
purchase to be valid. This restriction mimics historical restrictions on private banknote
issue in the U.S.
Second, our model presumes a special role for outside money. That is, outside
money will be the only acceptable medium for settlement of interbank transactions, when
the transactions do not take place through a private clearing arrangement. While
settlement in outside money is not a legal requirement in the U.S., it is commonA General Equilibrium Analysis of Check Float 5
expectation and a de facto requirement that such transactions be settled in outside funds.
4
This requirement will not hold for interbank transactions made through a private clearing
arrangement.
Third, we take as a legal requirement that checks must be honored at par value in
interbank exchange. This restriction has applied to virtually all interbank exchanges in the
U.S. since the 1920s.
5
Fourth, in keeping with U.S. banking history, we assume that banking markets are
“geographically dispersed,” and that banks are prohibited from branching into all banking
markets. Further, banks cannot form private clearing organizations across all banking
markets.
2.2  Preferences, Endowments, and Technology
Following Freeman (1996), the economy takes place on I+1 isolated locations
known as “islands,” where I is a large, even number. The first I islands are each inhabited
by a large number of two-period lived people. On each island, N new people are born in
each period t‡1. In the first period there is a group of N people (the “initial old”) who live
for only one period. Each person born on one of these islands is endowed when young
with y units of a good that is unique to that island. The good is not transportable across
islands, and is nonstorable in the sense that it vanishes at the end of the period if not
                                                       
4 In models where banks can hold risky portfolios, settlement on the books of a central bank (i.e., in
outside funds) can be value-enhancing if settlement arrangements allow for some risk-shifting from
commercial banks to the central bank. This incentive is modeled by Emmons (1995) and Kahn and
Roberds (1996). This incentive cannot be captured in the setup described below, since banks hold riskless
portfolios.
5 Duprey and Nelson (1986) describe the transition from nonpar to par checking.A General Equilibrium Analysis of Check Float 6
consumed. Instead, people wishing to make transactions will journey to other islands in
order to obtain their desired consumption good.
The first I islands are split into “archipelagoes.” An archipelago will define a local
banking market. Each archipelago contains an equal number of two types of islands,
“debtor” and “creditor” islands (see Figure 1).
People born on debtor islands (“debtors”) wish to consume some of their own
endowment good and also the good of a creditor island when young, and nothing when
old. On every debtor island, some debtors may want to consume creditor goods found on
creditor islands within their own archipelago, and others may wish to consume creditor
goods found on creditor islands of other archipelagoes. The utility of a debtor is given by
v c d t t ( , ), where ct  represents the debtor’s consumption of the creditor good, and dt  the
consumption of their own endowment good.
People born on creditor islands (“creditors”) wish to consume some of their own
endowment good while young, and also a good found on a particular debtor island while
old. In contrast to debtors, creditors never wish to buy goods from outside their own
archipelago. Creditors also cannot directly consume debtors’ endowment goods. A
debtor’s endowment must first be transformed by a production process (described below)
before it can be consumed by creditors. A creditor’s utility is given by u C D t t ( , ) +1 , where
Dt+1 represents the creditor’s consumption of the debtor good, and Ct  represents the
consumption of their own endowment good. The utility functions of both the debtors and
creditors are sufficiently well-behaved so that interior optima obtain for both types.
The I+1
st island is known as the “central island.” On the central island there are
commercial banks (“banks”), a central bank, and a government. Banks are infinitely lived,A General Equilibrium Analysis of Check Float 10
Young creditors who receive check payments from debtors deposit these checks at
a bank that has a branch on their island. These creditors draw on their bank funds when
they purchase debtor goods during the next period. Since creditors never travel outside
their own archipelago, we assume that all checks written by creditors are cleared through
the “local” clearinghouse.
3.  EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we assume that there are a sufficiently many banks’ branches on
each island so that banks are “perfectly competitive” in the following sense. Banks
compete with each other by offering depositors interest on deposits held more than one
period. Since profits are zero in equilibrium, banks end up paying all profits from their
bond portfolio to depositors. We also assume that deficits net-of-interest Gt  are zero.
3.1  Equilibrium without float
If there is no float then checks written at time t must be cleared and during period
t. Interest on deposits therefore accrues to creditors.
In order to trade, a young debtor must have some funds on deposit at a local bank
branch. The bank is willing to take a certain portion of the debtor’s endowment as a
deposit. That is if the debtor deposits  y dt -  debtor goods with the bank, the debtor’s
bank balance ht  will be given by
h y d p t t t = - ( ) (4)
where  pt  is the money price of a debtor good on a debtor island. The budget constraint
faced by debtors will thus beA General Equilibrium Analysis of Check Float 16
urban banking markets, competition has historically been restricted in many banking
markets in the U.S., particularly in rural areas.
To formally investigate the effects of imperfect competition, we consider an
extreme case of the model where each archipelago has only one bank. The single bank is
legally constrained to offer its customers a standard deposit contract (customers have full
access to funds on deposit), but the bank retains all earnings on its bond portfolio. For
purposes of tractability, we assume that the bank is only interested in consuming creditor
goods. The bank obtains these goods by writing checks on itself. We also assume that the
bank is sufficiently impatient so that it uses its bond income for immediate consumption.
First consider the case where there is no float so that checks clear in the same
period. The amount of income available to the bank is the interest on its previous period’s
bond portfolio. Hence in steady state its budget constraint is
c p rB t
B
t t
* = -1 (27)
where ct
B denotes the banker’s consumption of the creditor good. The market-clearing
condition requires that the value of funds available to purchase the creditor good equal



















A similar constraint applies to the debtor good. Note however that old creditors at time t
do not have claim to the bank’s entire stock of outside assets  M B t t + , since the bank
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case where there is no government debt and where all government deficits are financed
directly by money creation, so that
G M M t t t = - -1 (47)
then it is easy to show that the equilibrium allocation implied by equations (44), (45), and
(46) is identical to the equilibrium allocation of the monopoly model of the previous
section.
It is also possible to modify this version of the model to accommodate check float,
by allowing a one-period clearing lag for checks written to purchase creditor goods. As
with previous versions of the model, introducing float into the model does not change
equilibrium allocations. Since the derivation is essentially a repetition of that of the
previous section it is omitted.
4.3  Remote Disbursement
The analysis above implies a benign view of float. If delays occur in clearing and
settling checks (or any similar form of payment), then this analysis suggests that markets
can adjust so that the costs associated with these delays are appropriately priced.
Equilibrium allocations are unaffected by float, and are efficient so long as (1) the banking
industry is competitive, and (2) deficits are not financed by money creation.
Is this Panglossian view of float applicable to the U.S. payment system? The
obvious problem with this view is the additional processing costs associated with use of a
form of payment that involves float (checks) over other forms of payment that do not.
Even abstracting from cost considerations, we think that the answer to this question may
be “no,” due to the effects of certain institutional frictions. A potentially important frictionA General Equilibrium Analysis of Check Float 28
the collecting bank pays a significant portion thereof), the convenience associated with
check payment, and the high initial costs with associated with moving from paper-based to
electronic payments. More detailed empirical analysis is clearly needed to sort out the
relative magnitudes of these effects.A General Equilibrium Analysis of Check Float 29
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Figure 1: Movement of Agents in the Model
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